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Structural completeness in propositional logics of
dependence
Rosalie Iemhoff · Fan Yang
Abstract In this paper we prove that three of the main propositional logics of de-
pendence (including propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic), none of
which is structural, are structurally complete with respect to a class of substitutions
under which the logics are closed. We obtain an analogues result with respect to sta-
ble substitutions, for the negative variants of some well-known intermediate logics,
which are intermediate theories that are closely related to inquisitive logic.
Keywords structural completeness · dependence logic · inquisitive logic · interme-
diate logic
1 Introduction
In recent years there have appeared many results on admissible rules in logics. The
diversity of the results show that the properties of admissibility vary from logic to
logic, and the complexity of some of the results show that describing these rules is
not always an easy matter. The admissible rules of a logic are the rules under which
the logic is closed, meaning that one could add them to the logic without obtaining
new theorems. Since adding a derivable rule to a logic cannot alter that what can
be derived, derivable rules are always admissible, thus showing that the notion of
admissibility is a natural extension of the notion of derivability.
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For structural logics, which means logics that are closed under uniform substi-
tution, a rule is admissible if every substitution that unifies the premiss, unifies the
conclusion, where a substitution σ unifies a formula ϕ in a logic if σϕ is derivable in
the logic. Until now, most logics for which the admissibility relation has been studied
are structural. Main examples are classical and intuitionistic propositional logic and
certain modal logics such as K, K4, and S4. Except for classical logic, all these logics
have nonderivable admissible rules and their admissibility relations are decidable and
have concise axiomatizations [6,13,15,20,21]. In recent years, admissibility has been
studied for a plethora of other logics as well. However, logics that are not structural,
have received less attention. In order to obtain a meaningful notion of admissibility
for such a logic one first has to isolate a set of substitutions, as large as one thinks pos-
sible, under which the logic is closed. Admissibility can then be studied with respect
to this class of substitutions.
In this paper we show that three of the main propositional logics of dependence,
none of which is structural, are structurally complete with respect to the class of flat
substitutions. We obtain an analogues result, but then with respect to stable substi-
tutions, for the negative variants of some well-known intermediate logics, which are
intermediate theories that are closely related to one of the logics of dependence. As
a byproduct we develop an extension of the usual logics of dependence in which the
use of negation and the dependence atom is not restricted to propositional variables,
but to the much larger class of flat formulas instead.
We think the interest in these results lies in the fact that logics of dependence,
to be described below, are versatile and widely applicable nonclassical logics. And
knowing that many nonclassical logics have nontrivial adimissible rules, establishing
that in these logics all rules that are admissible (with respect to flat substitutions)
are derivable, provides a useful insight in the logics. Moreover, these results provide
one of the first examples of natural nonstructural logics for which admissibility is
studied. A paper in which various admissibility relations of nonstructural logics, the
same logics that we treat in Theorem 5.5, have been studied is [18], but the results
are different from the ones obtained here.
Dependence logic is a new logical formalism that characterizes the notion of “de-
pendence” in social and natural sciences. First-order dependence logic was intro-
duced by Va¨a¨na¨nen [23] as a development of Henkin quantifier [8] and independence-
friendly logic [10]. Recently, propositional dependence logic (PD) was studied and
axiomatized in [22,26]. With a different motivation, Ciardelli and Roelofsen [4] in-
troduced and axiomatized propositional inquisitive logic (InqL), which can be re-
garded as a natural variant of propositional dependence logic. Both PD and InqL are
fragments of propositional downwards closed team logic (PT), which was studied
in [26] and essentially also in [3]. Dependency relations are characterized in these
propositional logics of dependence by a new type of atoms =( #»p ,q), called depen-
dence atoms. Intuitively, the atom specifies that the proposition q depends completely
on the propositions #»p . The semantics of these logics is called team semantics, in-
troduced by Hodges [11,12]. The basic idea of this new semantics is that properties
of dependence cannot be manifested in single valuations, therefore unlike the case
of classical propositional logic, formulas in propositional logics of dependence are
evaluated on sets of valuations (called teams) instead.
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The three logics PD, InqL and PT are of particular interest, because they are
all expressively complete, in the sense that they characterize all downwards closed
nonempty collections of teams. As a result of the feature of team semantics, the sets
of theorems of these logics are closed under flat substitutions, but not closed under
uniform substitution. As mentioned above, in this paper we prove that the three logics
are structurally complete with respect to flat substitutions.
In the study of admissible rules there is a technical detail that needs to be ad-
dressed. In PD and PT, negation and the dependence operator can only be applied
to atoms. Therefore, the only substitutions under which these logics are closed are
renamings, substitutions that replace atoms by atoms. However, these logics can be
conservativily extended to logics that are closed under flat substitutions. These exten-
sions, PD and PT, are closed under flat substitutions, and for these logics, as well as
for InqL, the notion of admissibility with respect to flat substitutions is shown to be
equal to derivability (Theorem 5.4).
There is a close connection between inquisitive logic and certain intermediate log-
ics. The set of theorems of the former equals the negative variant of Kreisel-Putnam
logic (KP), which is equal to the negative variant of Medvedev logic (ML). It is open
whether KP is structurally complete, whereas ML is known to be structurally com-
plete but not hereditarily structurally complete. An interesting corollary we obtain in
this paper is that the negative variants of both ML and KP are hereditarily structurally
complete with respect to negative substitutions.
2 Logics of dependence
2.1 Syntax and semantics
We first define propositional downwards closed team logic. All of the logics of de-
pendence we consider in the paper are fragments of propositional downwards closed
team logic.
Definition 2.1 Let p,q, #»p = p1, . . . , pk be propositional variables. Well-formed for-
mulas of propositional downwards closed team logic (PT) are given by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ⊥ | ⊤ |=( #»p ,q) | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ⊗ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | ϕ → ϕ .
We call the formulas p, ¬p,⊥ and⊤ propositional atoms. The formula=( #»p ,q) is
called a dependence atom, and it shall be read as “q depends on #»p ”. The connective
⊗ is called tensor (disjunction), and the connectives ∨ and→ are called intuitionistic
disjunction and intuitionistic implication, respectively. The formula ϕ →⊥ is abbre-
viated as ¬ϕ , and the team semantics to be given guarantees that the formula ¬p and
p→⊥ are semantically equivalent.
Fragments of PT formed by certain sets of atoms and connectives in the standard
way are called (propositional) logics of dependence. The following table defines the
syntax of the other logics of dependence we consider in this paper.
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Logic Atoms Connectives
Propositional dependence logic (PD) p,¬p,⊥,⊤,=( #»p ,q) ∧,⊗
Propositional inquisitive logic (InqL) p,⊥,⊤ ∧,∨,→
Given any of the three logics L ∈ {PD, InqL,PT}, let LL denote the language of
L. We say that a formula ϕ is in LL if all symbols in ϕ belong to LL. Clearly, LInqL is
the same as the language of intuitionistic propositional logic or intermediate logics.
We will discuss the connection between InqL and intermediate logics in the sequel.
Note that formulas in LPD are assumed to be in (strict) negation normal form, in the
sense that negation is allowed only in front of propositional variables and dependence
atoms can not be negated. We will revisit the issue about negation in Section 3.1.
For the semantics, propositional logics of dependence adopt team semantics. A
team is a set of valuations, i.e., a set of functions v : Prop→{0,1}, where Prop is the
set of all propositional variables.
Definition 2.2 We inductively define the notion of a formula ϕ in LPT being true on
a team X, denoted by X |= ϕ , as follows:
– X |= p iff for all v ∈ X, v(p) = 1;
– X |= ¬p iff for all v ∈ X, v(p) = 0;
– X |=⊥ iff X = /0;
– X |=⊤ for all teams X;
– X |= =( #»p ,q) iff for all v,v′ ∈ X: v( #»p ) = s′( #»p ) =⇒ v(q) = v′(q);
– X |= ϕ ∧ψ iff X |= ϕ and X |= ψ;
– X |= ϕ ⊗ψ iff there exist teams Y,Z ⊆ X with X = Y ∪Z such that Y |= ϕ and
Z |= ψ;
– X |= ϕ ∨ψ iff X |= ϕ or X |= ψ;
– X |= ϕ → ψ iff for any team Y ⊆ X: Y |= ϕ =⇒ Y |= ψ .
If X |= ϕ holds for all teams X , then we say that ϕ is valid, denoted by |= ϕ . For
a finite set of formulas Γ , we write Γ |= ϕ and say that ϕ is a logical consequence of
Γ if X |=
∧
Γ =⇒ X |= ϕ holds for all teams X . In case Γ = {ϕ}, we write simply
ϕ |= ψ instead of {ϕ} |= ψ . If ϕ |= ψ and ψ |= ϕ , then we write ϕ ≡ ψ and say
that ϕ and ψ are semantically equivalent. Two logics of dependence L1 and L2 are
said to have the same expressive power if for every L1-formula ϕ , ϕ ≡ ψ for some
L2-formula ψ , and vice versa.
The logics of dependence mentioned above are defined as follows. Since in this
paper we consider the logics from a semantical point of view, using the team seman-
tics, we define their finitary consequence relations semantically.
Definition 2.3 (Consequence relations for logics of dependence) For a logic L ∈
{PD, InqL,PT}, formulas ϕ and finite sets of formulas Γ , Γ ⊢L ϕ if and only if ϕ
and all formulas in Γ are in LL and Γ |= ϕ . ϕ is valid in L, or a theorem of L, if
⊢L ϕ , which is short for /0 ⊢L ϕ . Thus theorems of PD and InqL are the restrictions of
the theorems of PT to LPD and LInqL, respectively.
Because of the semantical definition of the consequence relation ⊢L, soundness
and completeness with respect to the team semantics trivially holds. We will see,
however, that there do exist genuine syntactic characterizations of dependence logics,
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as given in Theorem 2.7 and the comments thereafter. Since in this paper the methods
are purely semantical, the semantically defined consequence relations suffice for our
aims.
We write ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) if the propositional variables occurring in ϕ are among
p1, . . . , pn. Given a set V of propositional variables, a valuation on V is a function
v : V → {0,1}, and a team on V is a set of valuations on V .
Theorem 2.4 Let ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) be a formula and Γ a set of formulas in LPT, and X
and Y two teams. Then the following holds.
(Locality) If {v ↾ {p1, . . . , pn} : v ∈ X}= {v ↾ {p1, . . . , pn} : v ∈Y}, then
X |= ϕ ⇐⇒ Y |= ϕ .
(Downwards Closure Property) If X |= ϕ and Y ⊆ X, then Y |= ϕ .
(Empty Team Property) /0 |= ϕ .
(Deduction Theorem) Γ ,ϕ |= ψ if and only if Γ |= ϕ → ψ .
(Compactness Theorem) If Γ |= ϕ , then there exists a finite set ∆ ⊆ Γ such that
∆ |= ϕ .
Given a formula ϕ and a finite set {ϕi | i ∈ I} of formulas we introduce a meta-
symbol
⊔
and use ϕ⊔i∈I ϕi as an abbreviation for the statement: For all teams X :
X |= ϕi implies X |= ϕ for all i ∈ I, and X |= ϕ implies X |= ϕi for some i ∈ I.
Theorem 2.5 (Disjunction property) Let ϕ be a formula and {ϕi | i ∈ I} a finite set
of formulas in LL. If ϕ⊔i∈I ϕi and |= ϕ , then |= ϕi for some i ∈ I.
Proof Let V = {p1, . . . , pn} be the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ and
{ϕi | i ∈ I}. Since |= ϕ , for the team X = {0,1}V , we have that X |= ϕ . It follows
from ϕ⊔i∈I ϕi that X |= ϕi for some i ∈ I. Noting that every team Y on V is a subset
of X , by the downwards closure property we obtain that Y |= ϕi, which implies |= ϕi
by locality.
A formula of PT is said to be classical if it does not contain any dependence
atoms or intuitionistic disjunction. Classical formulas ϕ of PT are flat, that is,
X |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ X , {v} |= ϕ
holds for all teams X . The following lemma shows that classical tautologies of PT
are exactly the tautologies of classical propositional logic.
Lemma 2.6 For any classical formula ϕ in LPT, identifying tensor disjunction with
classical disjunction of CPC, we have that |=CPC ϕ ⇐⇒ |=PT ϕ .
Proof An easy inductive proof shows that v |=CPC ϕ ⇐⇒ {v} |=PT ϕ for all valua-
tions v and all classical formulas ϕ .
Having the same syntax as intuitionistic logic, the logic InqL has a close relation-
ship with intermediate logics between ND and ML. In [4], a Hilbert-style deductive
system for InqL is given. The axioms of this system will play a role in this paper, so
we present the system in detail as follows.
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Theorem 2.7 ([4]) InqL is sound and strongly complete with respect to the following
Hilbert-style deductive system:
Axioms:
1. all theorems of IPC
2. ¬¬p → p for all p ∈ Prop
3. all substitution instances of NDk for all k ∈ N:
(NDk)
(
¬ϕ →
∨
1≤i≤k
¬ψi
)
→
∨
1≤i≤k
(¬ϕ →¬ψi).
Rule:
Modus Ponens: ϕ → ψ ψψ (MP)
Remark 2.8 InqL extended with dependence atoms is called propositional intuition-
istic dependence logic (PID) in the literature (see e.g., [25,26]). As noted in [25,26],
PID and InqL have the same expressive power, as dependence atoms are definable in
InqL:
=(p1, . . . , pn,q)≡ (p1∨¬p1)∧·· ·∧ (pn∨¬pn)→ (q∨¬q). (1)
Adding an axiom that corresponds to the above equivalence to the deductive system
of InqL, one obtains a complete axiomatization for PID. For simplicity, we will not
discuss the logic PID in this paper, but we remark that results obtained in this paper
can be easily generalized to PID.
The logic PD was first axiomatized by a natural deduction system in [25,26], and
a Hilbert-style axiomatization and a labelled tableau calculus for PD can be found
in [22]. Based on these, a natural deductive system for the fragment of PT without
dependence atoms was given in [3]. Adding to the deductive system in [3] obvious
rules for dependence atom that correspond to the equivalence in (1), one easily ob-
tains a complete natural deductive system for full PT. Interested readers are referred
to the literature given for the exact definitions of the deductive systems. Throughout
this paper, we take for granted the strong completeness theorem for these logics.
It is important to note that the deductive systems for PD, InqL and PT do not ad-
mit uniform substitution. Here substitutions, a crucial notion in this paper, are defined
as follows. The definition is sufficiently general to apply to both propositional logics
of dependence and intermediate logics that we consider later in the paper.
Definition 2.9 (Substitution) A substitution of a propositional logic or theory L is a
mapping σ from the set of all formulas in LL to the set of all formulas in LL, that
commutes with the connectives and atoms.
Definition 2.10 Let ⊢L be a consequence relation of a logic or theory L. A substitu-
tion σ is called a ⊢L-substitution if ⊢L is closed under σ , i.e., for all formulas ϕ ,ψ
in LL,
ϕ ⊢L ψ =⇒ σ(ϕ) ⊢L σ(ψ).
If ⊢L is closed under all substitutions, then we say that ⊢L is structural.
The consequence relations of the logics PD, InqL and PT are not structural, be-
cause, for example, p⊗ p ⊢PD p and ⊢InqL ¬¬p→ p, but =(p)⊗=(p) 0PD =(p) and
0InqL ¬¬(p∨¬p)→ p∨¬p.
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2.2 Normal forms
In this section, we recall from [4] and [26] the disjunctive normal forms for formulas
of PD, InqL and PT. These normal forms, reminiscent of the disjunctive normal
form in classical logic, play an important role in the main proofs of this paper and are
defined as follows.
Fix V = {p1, . . . , pn}. Let X be a nonempty team on V . For each of the logics PD,
InqL and PT, we define a formula ΘX as follows:
ΘX :=


⊗
v∈X
(pv(p1)1 ∧·· ·∧ p
v(pn)
n ) for PD, (2)
¬¬
∨
v∈X
(pv(p1)1 ∧·· ·∧ p
v(pn)
n ) for InqL, PT, (3)
where p1 := p and p0 := ¬p and we stipulate that Θ /0 := ⊥. The reader can ver-
ify readily that the above two formulas are semantically equivalent. This is why we
decide to be sloppy here and use the same notation ΘX to stand for two syntactically
different formulas. We tacitly assume that ΘX is given by (2) in the context of PD
and by (3) in the context of InqL. For PT we could as well have chosen (2) as the
definition of ΘX , as both defining formulas belong to LPT and are equivalent.
With respect to the domain V , the formula ΘX defines the team X (module sub-
teams), as stated in the following lemma, whose proof is left to the reader or see
[26].
Lemma 2.11 Let X and Y be teams on V . For the logics PD, InqL and PT, we have
that Y |=ΘX ⇐⇒ Y ⊆ X .
The set JϕK = {X ⊆ {0,1}V : X |= ϕ} is nonempty (as /0 ∈ JϕK) and downwards
closed, i.e., Y ⊆ X ∈ JϕK =⇒ Y ∈ JϕK. We say that a propositional logic L of depen-
dence is expressively complete, if every nonempty downwards closed collection K of
teams on V is definable by a formula ϕ in LL, i.e., K = JϕK.
Theorem 2.12 ([4][26]) (i) All of the logics PT, PD and InqL are expressively com-
plete and have the same expressive power.
(ii) (Normal Forms) Let ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) be a formula in LPT or LPD or LInqL. There
exists a finite collection {Xi | i ∈ I} of teams on V such that ϕ⊔i∈I ΘXi . In partic-
ular, ϕ ≡∨i∈I ΘXi holds for PT and InqL.
Proof We only give a proof sketch. For (i), let K be a nonempty downwards closed
collection of teams on V . The formula
∨
X∈KΘX in LPT or LInqL satisfies K =
J
∨
X∈KΘXK by Lemma 2.11. The proof for the logic PD follows from a different
argument; we refer the reader to [26] for details.
For every formula ϕ , the set JϕK is nonempty and downwards closed. Thus the
item (ii) follows from the proof of item (i).
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2.3 Intermediate logics
There is a close relationship between logics of dependence and intermediate theories
(i.e., theories between intuitionistic and classical logic), as first formulated in [4].
Here we describe this connection, and in the sections on projectivity and admissibility
we will treat dependence logics and intermediate theories side by side.
An intermediate theory is a set L of formulas closed under modus ponens such
that IPC ⊆ L ⊆ CPC. An intermediate logic is an intermediate theory closed under
uniform substitution. The intermediate logics that are most relevant in this paper are
Maksimova’s logic ND, Kreisel-Putnam logic KP and Medvedev’s logic ML (“the
logic of finite problems”). It is well-known that ND ⊆ KP ⊆ ML, and ML is the
maximal intermediate logic extending ND that has the disjunction property.
We call a substitution σ stable in a logic L that has implication and negation in
its language if σ(p) is stable in L, i.e., ⊢L σ(p)↔ ¬¬σ(p), for all p ∈ Prop. It is
easy to verify that the substitution (·)¬, defined as p¬ = ¬p for all p ∈ Prop, is a
stable substitution in all intermediate logics. For any intermediate logic L, define its
negative variant L¬ as
L¬ = {ϕ | ϕ¬ ∈ L}.
Lemma 2.13 ([4]) Let L be an intermediate logic.
(i) L¬ is the smallest intermediate theory that contains L and ¬¬p → p for every
p ∈ Prop.
(ii) The consequence relation ⊢L¬ of L¬ is closed under stable substitutions.
(iii) If L has the disjunction property, then so does L¬.
Lemma 2.14 Let L be an intermediate logic such that ND ⊆ L. Every formula is
provably equivalent to a formula of the form ∨i∈I¬ϕi in L¬.
Proof The lemma follows essentially from [4]. Each formula ¬ϕi is a ΘX formula as
defined in (3) for some set X of valuations, and the proof makes essential use of the
axioms of ND and Lemma 2.13(i).
It was shown in [4] that the negative variants of all of the intermediate logics
between ND and ML (including KP) are identical. Propositional inquisitive logic
InqL is the negative variant of such logics. We state this and other properties of InqL
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.15 ([4]) (i) For any intermediate logic L such that ND ⊆ L ⊆ ML, we
have that InqL= L¬.
(ii) InqL has the disjunction property and its consequence relation ⊢InqL is closed
under stable substitutions.
There are many intermediate logics, including ND and KP, for which not much
is known about their admissible rules. In Theorem 5.5 we show that the negative
fragment of intermediate logics between ND and ML is structurally complete with
respect to stable substitutions. Although we cannot immediately draw conclusions
from this about the admissibility in the original logics, we hope that our results can
be of help in the understanding of admissibility in these logics some day.
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3 Extensions of the logics and substitutions
3.1 Extensions of the logics
For intermediate logics and InqL, all possible substitutions are well-defined, meaning
that given a formula and a substitution in the language of the logic, applying that
substitution to the formula results in a formula in that language. However, for the
other logics of dependence that we consider in this paper (i.e., PD and PT), substitu-
tion is not well-defined. A counter example is the formulas =(p1, . . . , pn,q) and ¬p,
for which the substitution instances =(σ p1, . . . ,σ pn,σq) and ¬σ(p) only belongs to
LPD or/and LPT if σ maps every propositional variable to a propositional variable.
For the study of admissibility one has to isolate the (or a meaningful) set of well-
defined substitutions under which a consequence relation of a logic is closed. For this
purpose, in this section we expand the languages of the logics PD and PT so as to
force flat substitutions to be well-defined, and we will show in the next section that
these extensions are closed under flat substitutions.
Definition 3.1 The following grammars define well-formed formulas of the extended
logics of dependence.
– The extended propositional downwards closed team logic (PT):
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ⊤ |=( #»ϕ ,ϕ) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ⊗ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | ϕ → ϕ .
– The extended propositional dependence logic (PD):
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ⊤ |=( #»α ,β ) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ⊗ϕ ,
where #»α ,β are flat formulas.
The extended logics have arbitrary negation as well-formed formulas. In the se-
quel we will give a semantics for the negation that is well conservative over the re-
stricted negation in the original logics but not found in the literature. The extension
PT has dependence atoms with arbitrary arguments, while in the extension PD we
only allow dependence atoms with flat arguments. The restriction for PD is made for
technical simplicity that we discuss in the sequel, but as we consider flat substitutions
only, this limitation does not affect the generality of the results in this paper. Gener-
alized dependence atoms with flat arguments are also studied in the context of modal
dependence logic, see [5][7].
Below we define the semantics of the new formulas. We first treat PT and then
PD.
Definition 3.2 Let ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ be arbitrary formulas of PT. Define
(a) X |==(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ) iff X |=∧ni=1(ϕi∨ (ϕi →⊥))→ (ψ ∨ (ψ →⊥));1
(b) X |= ¬ϕ iff X |= ϕ →⊥ iff {v} 6|= ϕ for all v ∈ X.
1 The authors would like to thank Ivano Ciardelli for suggesting this definition, see also [3].
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In order for these definitions to be well-defined they have to agree with previ-
ously defined notions. For the dependence atom the observation in (1) suffices. For
negation, it suffices for PT that ¬ϕ has been defined as a shorthand for ϕ →⊥, thus
the semantics for negation as given in item (b) coincides with that in this logic.
We turn to PD. To define the semantics of the new formulas we need the following
equivalence relation between valuations. Given a sequence #»ϕ = ϕ1 . . .ϕn of formulas,
define an equivalence relation ∼ #»ϕ on teams as follows:
u∼ #»ϕ v iff ∀1≤ i≤ n({u} |= ϕi ⇔ {v} |= ϕi).
Definition 3.3 Define
(a) for flat formulas α1, . . . ,αk,β of PD,
X |==( #»α ,β )≡df ∀v,v′ ∈ X(v∼ #»α v′ =⇒ v∼β v′); (4)
(b) full negation in PD as X |= ¬ϕ iff {v} 6|= ϕ for all v ∈ X.
We have to show that the notions defined in Definition 3.3 are extensions of the
corresponding notions for PD, and also special case of those of PT. Obviously for the
formula =( #»p ,q), the semantics given in item (a) coincides with the semantics given
in Definition 2.2, and we leave it to the reader to check that it also coincides with
Definition 3.2(a).
The negation defined in item (b) deserves more comments. It is straightforward
from the definition that ¬ϕ is always flat, and such defined negation coincides with
that of PT. In the literature of first-order dependence logic, negation is usually treated
only syntactically, in the sense that a negated formula ¬ϕ is defined to have the same
semantics as the unique formula ϕ∼ in negation normal form obtained by exhaus-
tively applying the De Morgan’s laws and some other syntactic rewrite rules. The
corresponding syntactic rewrite rules for propositional dependence logic are as fol-
lows:
p∼ 7→ ¬p ⊤∼ 7→ ⊥ (ϕ ∧ψ)∼ 7→ ϕ∼⊗ψ∼
(¬p)∼ 7→ p ⊥∼ 7→ ⊤ (ϕ⊗ψ)∼ 7→ ϕ∼∧ψ∼
=( #»ϕ ,ψ)∼ 7→ ⊥
(5)
It is easy to see that the syntactic rewrite procedure for a negated formula ¬ϕ of PD
defined as above always terminates on a unique dependence atom-free formula ϕ∼ in
negation normal form in LPD.
When applying the syntactic negation, special attention needs to be paid to dou-
ble negations of dependence atoms, i.e., formulas of the form ¬¬=( #»a ,b), where the
variables #»a ,b are first-order or propositional. Following Hintikka’s game-theoretic
perspective of logic (see, e.g., [9]), the negation in logics of dependence is usually
treated as a connective upon reading which the two players in the corresponding se-
mantic game swap their roles. This way ¬¬=( #»a ,b) should have the same meaning
as =( #»a ,b), however, this reading is not consistent with the syntactic rewrite rules as
in (5) (see e.g., [19] for further discussions). To avoid ambiguity, most literature of
logics of dependence does not allow double negation to occur in front of dependence
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atoms. In this paper, in the extended logic PD we do include double negated depen-
dence atoms as well-formed formulas, but as we do not take the game-theoretic ap-
proach to propositional logics of dependence, the semantics of double negated depen-
dence atoms is computed simply according to Definition 3.3(b), namely, ¬¬=( #»p ,q)
is always semantically equivalent to ⊤ (noting that =( #»p ,q) is always true on single-
ton teams). Given such interpretation of the double negated dependence atoms, the
negation defined in Definition 3.3(b) coincides with the syntactic negation given by
the rewrite rules in (5), as we will show in the next lemma. However, on the other
hand, in the context of first-order dependence logic, regardless how double negated
dependence atoms are treated, the negation defined as in Definition 3.3(b) does not
coincide with the syntactic negation given by the rewrite rules (rather, it corresponds
to the defined connective ∼↓ in Hodges [11,12]). For instance, the reader who is
familiar with the semantics of first-order dependence logic can easily verify that
M 6|={s} ∀x=(x) holds for all assignments s on all models M, assuming that the do-
main of a model has at least two elements. Thus by Definition 3.3(b) M |=X ¬∀x=(x)
for all teams X on all models M, namely ¬∀x=(x) ≡ ⊤. However, by the syntactic
rewrite rules, (∀x=(x))∼ = ∃x(=(x))∼ = ∃x⊥.
Lemma 3.4 For any formula ϕ in LPD, we have that ¬ϕ ≡ ϕ∼.
Proof We prove by induction on ϕ that X |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ X |= ϕ∼ for all teams X .
The case ϕ = p or ⊥ or ⊤ is easy. If ϕ = ¬p, then ϕ∼ = p and we have that
X |= ¬¬p ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ X : {v} 6|= ¬p ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ X : {v} |= p ⇐⇒ X |= p.
If ϕ = =( #»p ,q), then ϕ∼ = ⊥ and we have that X |= ¬=( #»p ,q) ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ X :
{v} 6|==( #»p ,q) ⇐⇒ X = /0 ⇐⇒ X |=⊥.
If ϕ = ψ ∧ χ , then ϕ∼ = ψ∼⊗ χ∼ and we have that
X |= ¬(ψ ∧ χ) ⇐⇒∀v ∈ X : {v} 6|= ψ ∧ χ
⇐⇒∃Y,Z ⊆ X s.t. (∀v ∈ Y : {v} 6|= ψ) and (∀u ∈ Z : {u} 6|= χ)
⇐⇒∃Y,Z ⊆ X s.t. Y |= ¬ψ and Z |= ¬χ
⇐⇒∃Y,Z ⊆ X s.t. Y |= ψ∼ and Z |= χ∼
(by the induction hypothesis)
⇐⇒ X |= ψ∼⊗ χ∼.
If ϕ = ψ⊗ χ , then ϕ∼ = ψ∼∧ χ∼ and we have by the induction hypothesis that
X |= ¬(ψ⊗ χ) ⇐⇒∀v ∈ X : {v} 6|= ψ⊗ χ
⇐⇒∀v ∈ X : {v} 6|= ψ and {v} 6|= χ
⇐⇒ X |= ¬ψ and X |= ¬χ
⇐⇒ X |= ψ∼∧ χ∼ (by the induction hypothesis).
It is evident from Definition 3.3(b) that the full negation of PD is a semantic
connective. An k-ary connective> is called a semantic connective, if
ϕ1 ≡ ψ1, . . . , ϕk ≡ ψk =⇒ >(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk)≡>(ψ1, . . . ,ψk).
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Lemma 3.4 states that the semantical negation of PD defined in Definition 3.3(b) and
the syntactic negation given by (5) coincide. It is worth emphasizing that in contrast
to PD and other familiar logics with negation, the syntactic negation of first-order
dependence logic is not a semantic connective (regardless how double negated de-
pendence atoms are treated), as shown by Burgess [1] and Va¨a¨na¨nen and Kontinen
[16]. For an illustration, ∀x=(x)≡∀x∀y(x = y), whereas by the syntactic rewrite rules
(∀x=(x))∼ = ∃x⊥ 6≡ ∃x∃y(x 6= y) = (∀x∀y(x = y))∼.
The logics PD and PT are expressively complete, therefore their extensions have
the same expressive power as the original ones. Thus it is straightforward to verify
that Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.12 hold also for the extended logics PD and PT.
One can easily extend the deductive systems of the original logics by adding char-
acterization rules for the negation and generalized dependence atoms and prove the
sound and completeness theorems for the extensions. To characterize the negation,
to the deductive systems of PT and PD one adds the obvious rules that character-
ize the equivalence between ¬ϕ and ϕ →⊥, and the obvious rules that characterize
the rewrite rules in (5), respectively. To characterize generalized dependence atoms,
to the deductive system of PT one adds obvious rules that correspond to the equiv-
alence in Definition 3.2(a). For PD, following the idea in [26] one generalizes the
rules for dependence atoms in the deductive system of PD according to the equiva-
lence in Definition 3.2(a) in an obvious way. To prove the completeness theorem for
such obtained system of PD, one observes that whenever ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ are flat,
=(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ)≡
∨
f∈{0,1}X
⊗
v∈X
(ϕv(ϕ1)1 ∧·· ·∧ϕ
v(ϕn)
n ∧ψ f (v)) (6)
holds, where X = {0,1}{ϕ1,...,ϕn}, ϕ1i = ϕi and ϕ0i = ¬ϕi, and modifies the definition
of a realization of a generalised dependence atom accordingly. Note that if the ar-
guments ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ of a generalized dependence atom are not assumed to be flat,
Equation (6) will no longer hold, and we do not see at this moment how to obtain
a complete axiomatization of the extended logic also in the general case. But since
the notion of admissibility we study in this paper concerns theoremhood of our log-
ics only, and we intensionally defined the consequence relations of our logics in a
semantic manner (see Definition 2.3), this obstacle in the axiomatization of the ex-
tended logic is not essential for the main results of this paper. In view of this, for
simplicity in PD we only allow generalized dependence atoms with flat arguments.
3.2 Closure under flat substitutions
The consequence relations of the logics PD, InqL, and PT are not structural. In this
section we prove, however, that the consequence relations of these logics are closed
under flat substitutions, i.e., substitutions σ such that σ maps propositional variables
to flat formulas. To this end, we define the following translation on teams. For any
valuation v and any substitution σ , define a valuation vσ as
vσ (p) =
{
1 if {v} |= σ(p);
0 if {v} 6|= σ(p).
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For any team X , we define Xσ = {vσ | v ∈ X}. Given a team Y ⊆ Xσ , let Y σX denote
the set {v ∈ X | vσ ∈ Y}. Clearly Y σX ⊆ X and (Y σX )σ = Y .
Lemma 3.5 Let L ∈ {PD, InqL,PT}. For all formulas ϕ and all flat substitutions σ
in LL,
X |= σ(ϕ) ⇐⇒ Xσ |= ϕ .
Proof We prove this lemma for all three logics at the same time by induction on the
complexity of ϕ , where we use the following complexity c(ϕ) on formulas in LPT.
The use of the complicated clause for the dependence atom will become clear in the
proof below.
c(p) = 0 p a propositional variable
c(⊥) = 0
c(⊤) = 0
c(¬ϕ) = c(ϕ)+ 1
c(ϕ ◦ψ) = c(ϕ)+ c(ψ)+ 1 ◦ ∈ {∧,→,⊗}
c(=( #»ϕ ,ψ)) =
(
∑ni=1(2c(ϕi)+ 4)
)
+ 2c(ψ)+ 4 where ϕ = ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn.
The cases ϕ =⊥ and ϕ = ⊤ are trivial. Since σ(p) is flat, the following equiva-
lences hold:
X |= σ(p) ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ X({v} |= σ(p)) ⇐⇒ ∀vσ ∈ Xσ ({vσ} |= p) ⇐⇒ Xσ |= p.
Thus the case ϕ = p is proved.
Case ϕ ==( #»θ ,ψ). For PT, from Definition 3.2(a) we know that ϕ is semantically
equivalent to a formula in its language whose subformulas are of lower complexity,
thus this case is reduced to the other cases. However for PD, the equivalent formula
given by Definition 3.2(a) is not in its language, neither does the equivalent formula
given by Equation (6). Since PD is expressively complete, there indeed exists a for-
mula ϕ ′ in the language of PD that is equivalent to ϕ . However, this translation is not
done in a compositional manner, neither in an inductive manner (see Theorem 2.12).
We therefore cannot reduce this case to the other cases for PD, as the reduction would
assume
ϕ ≡ ϕ ′ =⇒ σ(ϕ)≡ σ(ϕ ′),
a fact that we establish only in Theorem 3.7. To avoid such a circular argument, we
now proceed to prove this case for PD directly, using the equivalent semantics given
in Definition 3.2(a) and assuming that θ and ψ are flat.
For the direction “=⇒”, assume X |==(σ(θ ),σ(ψ)) and Y |=∧ni=1(θi∨¬θi) for
some Y ⊆Xσ . As (Y σX )σ =Y and c(
∧n
i=1(θi∨¬θi))<Σni=1(2c(θi)+4)< c(=(
#»θ ,χ)),
by the induction hypothesis, we obtain that Y σX |=
∧n
i=1(σ(θi)∨ ¬σ(θi)). Clearly
Y σX ⊆ X , thus the assumption implies that Y σX |= σ(ψ)∨¬σ(ψ), which by the in-
duction hypothesis again gives the desired (Y σX )σ |= ψ ∨¬ψ , because c(ψ ∨¬ψ) =
2c(ψ)+3 < c(=( #»θ ,ψ)). The other direction “⇐=” is symmetric, using Yσ ⊆ Xσ for
any X ,Y with Y ⊆ X .
The cases that ϕ = ψ ∧ χ and ϕ = ψ ∨ χ follow immediately from the induction
hypothesis.
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Case ϕ = ψ ⊗ χ . We first prove the direction “=⇒”. Assume X |= σ(ϕ) and
consider Y,Z ⊆ X such that X = Y ∪ Z and Y |= σ(ψ) and Z |= σ(χ). Using that
Yσ ∪Zσ = Xσ , this implies Xσ |= ψ⊗ χ by the induction hypothesis.
For the direction “⇐=”, assume Xσ |= ϕ and consider Y,Z ⊆ Xσ such that Xσ =
Y ∪Z, Y |= ψ and Z |= χ . Thus Y σX |= σ(ψ) and ZσX |= σ(χ) by the induction hypoth-
esis. Since X = Y σX ∪ZσX , this implies X |= σ(ψ)⊗σ(χ), as required.
Case ϕ =ψ → χ . We first prove the direction “=⇒”. Assume X |= σ(ϕ) and con-
sider Y ⊆ Xσ such that Y |= ψ . As (Y σX )σ = Y , Y σX |= σ(ψ) follows by the induction
hypothesis. And as Y σX ⊆ X , this implies Y σX |= σ(χ). Hence Y |= χ by the induction
hypothesis, as required. The direction “⇐=” is similar.
Case ϕ = ¬ψ . It follows from the induction hypothesis that X |= ¬σ(ψ) ⇐⇒
∀v ∈ X : {v} 6|= σ(ψ) ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ X : {vσ} 6|= ψ ⇐⇒ Xσ |= ¬ψ .
Lemma 3.6 The set of flat formulas in LPT is closed under flat substitutions, i.e.,
whenever ϕ is a flat formula and σ is a flat substitution, σ(ϕ) is flat too.
Proof Suppose X is a team such that for all v ∈ X , {v} |= σ(ϕ). To show that X |=
σ(ϕ), by Lemma 3.5, it suffices to show that Xσ |= ϕ . As ϕ is flat, we therefore have
to show that {vσ} |= ϕ for all s ∈ X . Again by Lemma 3.5 it suffices to show that
{v} |= σ(ϕ) for all v ∈ X . But that is what we assumed, so we are done.
As a consequence of the above lemma, for every generalized dependence atom
=(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ) in LPD, where ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ are flat formulas, the resulting formula
=(σ(ϕ1), . . . ,σ(ϕn),ψ) under an arbitrary flat substitution σ is still a well-formed
formula in LPD. This shows that flat substitutions are well-defined in PD.
Theorem 3.7 The consequence relations of PD, InqL, and PT are closed under flat
substitutions. In particular, for all flat substitutions σ , we have that ϕ ≡ ψ implies
σ(ϕ)≡ σ(ψ).
Proof By the definition of the consequence relations, it suffices to prove that for all
formulas ϕ and ψ , ϕ |= ψ =⇒ σ(ϕ) |= σ(ψ) holds for all flat substitutions σ .
Assume ϕ |= ψ . We have that for any team X , any flat substitution σ ,
X |= σ(ϕ) =⇒ Xσ |= ϕ (by Lemma 3.5)
=⇒ Xσ |= ψ (by the assumption)
=⇒ X |= σ(ψ) (by Lemma 3.5)
Hence σ(ϕ) |= σ(ψ).
4 Flat formulas and projective formulas
Having proved that our logics are closed under flat substitutions we work towards
the proof of our main results by showing that flatness in these logics is nothing but
projectivity, a key notion in the study of admissible rules.
As the building blocks of the normal form of formulas in LPT, the formulas ΘX ,
defined in Section 2.2, turn out to be of particular interest. They actually serve as a
syntactic characterization of flat formulas, as the following lemma shows.
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Lemma 4.1 Let ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) be a consistent formula in LPT. The following are
equivalent.
(i) ϕ is flat;
(ii) ϕ ≡ΘX for some nonempty team X on {p1, . . . , pn};
(iii) ϕ ≡ ¬¬ϕ;
(iv) |= ϕ⊗¬ϕ
Proof (ii)⇒(i) and (iii)⇒(i) follow from the fact that negated formulas are flat, and
(i)⇒(iii) follows immediately from the definition of negation.
(i)⇒(ii): In view of Lemma 2.11 and Theorem 2.12, without loss of generality,
we may assume that ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) =
∨k
i=1 ΘXi , where {X1, . . . ,Xk} is a collection
of some nonempty maximal (with respect to set inclusion) teams on {p1, . . . , pn}.
Suppose ϕ is flat and k > 1. For each 1 ≤ i < k, pick vi ∈ Xi \Xi+1 and pick vk ∈
Xk \X1. The maximality of the Xi’s guarantees that such vi’s exist. Since {vi}⊆ Xi and
{v1, . . . ,vk}* Xi for all 1≤ i≤ k, by Lemma 2.11, {vi} |=ΘXi and {v1, . . . ,vk} 6|=ΘXi
for all 1≤ i≤ k, thereby {vi} |= ϕ for all 1≤ i≤ k whereas {v1, . . . ,vk} 6|= ϕ . Hence
we conclude that k = 1 and ϕ =ΘX1 , as required.
(i)⇒(iv): If ϕ is flat, to show (iv), it suffices to show {v} |= ϕ⊗¬ϕ , i.e., {v} |= ϕ
or {v} |= ¬ϕ , for all valuations v. But this is also obvious.
(iv)⇒(i): Suppose {v} |= ϕ for all valuations v in a team X . Then Y 6|= ¬ϕ for all
nonempty Y ⊆ X . Now, if |= ϕ ⊗¬ϕ , then we must have that X |= ϕ , which shows
that ϕ is flat.
Since some of the logics we consider in this paper do not have implication in the
language, and none of them is closed under uniform substitution, we modify the usual
definition of projective formula.
Definition 4.2 (Projective formula) Let L be a logic, and S a set of L-substitutions.
A formula ϕ in LL is said to be S-projective in L if there exists σ ∈ S such that
(a) ⊢L σ(ϕ),
(b) ϕ ,σ(p) ⊢L p and ϕ , p ⊢L σ(p) for all propositional variables p.
Such substitutions are called S-projective unifiers for ϕ in L.
Because of the Deduction Theorem (Theorem 2.4) of our logics that has implica-
tion in their languages the notion of projectivity can be formulated purely in terms of
theoremhood. A standard inductive proof shows that the condition in Definition 4.2(b)
implies that ϕ ,σ(ψ) ⊢L ψ and ϕ ,ψ ⊢L σ(ψ) hold for all formulas ϕ and ψ of our
logics.
The proof of the following lemma uses what is known as Prucnal’s trick, which
consists of a method to prove projectivity via a connection between valuations and
substitutions.
Lemma 4.3 Let L ∈ {InqL,PT} and X a nonempty set of teams on a finite set of
propositional variables. The formula ΘX inLL (defined by Equation (3)) isF -projective
in L, where F is the class of all flat substitutions.
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Proof Put ϕ = ΘX and pick v ∈ X . View ϕ as a formula of CPC, clearly we have
v(pv(p1)1 ∧·· ·∧ p
v(pn)
n ) = 1, thereby v(ϕ) = 1. Define a substitution σϕv as follows:
σϕv (p) =
{
ϕ ∧ p, if v(p) = 0;
ϕ → p, if v(p) = 1.
(7)
Put σ = σϕv . Clearly, σ(p) (in both cases) is classical, thus flat.
By a standard inductive argument, one proves that
⊢CPC σ(ψ) ⇐⇒ v(ψ) = 1 (8)
for all subformulas ψ of ϕ . Now, as v(ϕ) = 1, we obtain ⊢CPC σ(ϕ). Since ϕ is a
classical formula, by Lemma 2.6 we derive ⊢L σ(ϕ). Moreover, it follows from the
definition of σ that ⊢L ϕ → (σ(p)↔ p) holds for all p ∈ Prop. Hence we conclude
that ϕ is F -projective in L.
It is known that negated formulas ¬ϕ are projective in every intermediate logic
L, it follows, for example, from Ghilardi’s characterization in [6]. Here we prove that
the same holds for the negative variants of intermediate logics and that the projective
unifiers involved are moreover stable.
Lemma 4.4 Let L be an intermediate logic. Every consistent formula ¬ϕ is ST -
projective in L¬, where ST is the class of all stable substitutions.
Proof Take a valuation v such that v(¬ϕ) = 1. Define a substitution σ¬ϕv for ¬ϕ in
exactly the same way as in (7) of the preceding lemma. Put σ = σ¬ϕv . The definition
of σ guarantees that⊢L ϕ → (σ(p)↔ p) holds for all p∈Prop. By (8) and Glivenko’s
Theorem (see e.g. Theorem 2.47 in [2]), we obtain that ⊢L ¬σ(ϕ). Hence we have
proved that ¬ϕ is projective in L. Now, by Lemma 2.13 L⊆ L¬, thus ¬ϕ is projective
also in L¬.
It remains to check that the σ defined as above is a stable substitution in L¬, i.e.,
⊢L¬ σ(p)↔ ¬¬σ(p) for all p ∈ Prop. If v(p) = 0, then by the definition, we have
that σ(p) = ¬ϕ ∧ p. Since ⊢L¬ ¬¬p → p (by Lemma 2.13), we have that
¬¬σ(p) = ¬¬(¬ϕ ∧ p) ⊣⊢ ¬¬¬ϕ ∧¬¬p ⊣⊢ ¬ϕ ∧ p = σ(p),
as required. If v(p) = 1, then by the definition we have that σ(p) = ¬ϕ → p. Since
⊢L¬ ¬¬p → p, we have that
¬¬σ(p) = ¬¬(¬ϕ → p) ⊣⊢ ¬¬¬ϕ →¬¬p ⊣⊢ ¬ϕ → p = σ(p),
as required.
Lemma 4.5 For any nonempty team X on a set {p1, . . . , pn} of propositional vari-
ables, the formula ΘX in LPD (defined by Equation (2)) is F -projective in PD.
Structural completeness in propositional logics of dependence 17
Proof This lemma is proved also using a similar argument to that of Lemma 4.3.
Put ϕ = ΘX . Take an arbitrary v ∈ X . Clearly, v(ϕ) = 1 when ϕ is viewed as a for-
mula of CPC (hereafter in the proof, we identify tensor disjunction ⊗ with classical
disjunction). Define a substitution σϕv as follows:
σϕv (p) =
{
ϕ ∧ p, if v(p) = 0;
¬ϕ ∨ p, if v(p) = 1.
Put σ = σϕv . Clearly, the formula σ(p) (in both cases) is classical, thus flat.
As in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we have that (8) holds for all subformulas ψ of ϕ ,
thus ⊢CPC σ(ϕ). Now, since the formula σ(ϕ) is classical, we obtain by Lemma 2.6
that ⊢PD σ(ϕ).
It remains to show that ϕ ,σ(p) ⊢L p and ϕ , p ⊢L σ(p) for all p ∈ Prop. If v(p) =
0, then clearly ϕ ,ϕ ∧ p ⊢PD p and ϕ , p ⊢PD ϕ ∧ p. If v(p) = 1, to see that ϕ ,¬ϕ ⊗
p ⊢PD p, if X |= ϕ ∧ (¬ϕ⊗ p), then for all v ∈ X , we have that {v} |= ϕ ∧ (¬ϕ⊗ p),
which implies that {v} |= p, thereby X |= p, as required. That ϕ , p⊢PD ¬ϕ⊗ p follows
easily from the fact that p ⊢PD ¬ϕ⊗ p.
Lemma 4.6 Let L ∈ {PD, InqL,PT}, and ϕ a consistent formula in LL. The follow-
ing are equivalent:
(i) ϕ ⊣⊢ΘX for some nonempty n-team X;
(ii) ϕ is flat;
(iii) ϕ is F -projective in L;
Proof (ii)⇐⇒ (i)=⇒(iii) follows from Lemmas 4.1, 4.3 and 4.5. Now, we show that
(iii)=⇒(i). Suppose ϕ is F -projective in L and σ is a F -projective unifier for ϕ .
Thus ⊢L σ(ϕ), which implies |= σ(ϕ). By Theorem 2.5, this implies that there exists
1 ≤ i ≤ k such that |= σ(ΘXi). Since ΘXi is in LL and thus so is σ(ΘXi), ⊢L σ(ΘXi)
follows. On the other hand, we also have that ϕ ,σ(ΘXi) ⊢L ΘXi . It then follows that
ϕ ⊢L ΘXi . Hence ϕ ≡ΘXi , which gives ϕ ⊣⊢ΘXi .
Lemma 4.7 Let L be an intermediate logic such that ND ⊆ L and ϕ a consistent
formula in LL. The following are equivalent:
(i) ⊢L¬ ϕ ↔¬¬ϕ;
(ii) ϕ is ST -projective in L¬;
Proof (i)=⇒(ii) follows from Lemma 4.4. For (ii)=⇒(i), by Theorem 2.15, in L¬ we
have that ϕ ⊣⊢ ∨i∈I¬ϕi for some formulas {¬ϕi | i ∈ I}. By a similar argument to
that in the proof of “(iii)=⇒(i)” of Lemma 4.6, we obtain in L¬ that ϕ ⊣⊢ ¬ϕi for
some i ∈ I, which implies that ⊢L¬ ϕ ↔¬¬ϕ .
5 Structural completeness of the logics
In this section we prove the main results of our paper, namely that the three proposi-
tional logics of dependence PD, InqL, and PT are F -structurally complete and that
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the negative variants of logics extending ND are hereditarily ST -structurally com-
plete. In both cases the proof of the fact is based on the existence, for every formula
ϕ , of certain S-projective formulas ϕi such that ϕ⊔i∈I ϕi, where in the first case S
consists of all flat substitutions and in the second case of all stable ones. As mentioned
in Remark 2.8, it is not hard to prove by the same methods that also the logic PID
is F -structurally complete, where PID is an extension of propositional intuitionistic
dependence logic PID in the same manner as PT is an extension of PT.
Definition 5.1 Let L be a logic, and S a set of ⊢L-substitutions. A rule ϕ/ψ of L is
said to be S-admissible, in symbols ϕ |∼SL ψ , if for all σ ∈ S, ⊢L σ(ϕ) =⇒⊢L σ(ψ).
In case S is the set of all substitutions, we write |∼ for |∼S , and such a rule is
called an admissible rule.
Definition 5.2 A logic L is said to be S-structurally complete if every S-admissible
rule of L is derivable in L, i.e., ϕ |∼SL ψ ⇐⇒ ϕ ⊢L ψ . In case S is the set of all
substitutions and L is S-structurally complete, we say that L is structurally complete.
Informally, a rule is admissible in a logic L if its addition to the logic does not
change the theorems that are derivable. Clearly, if S is a set of L-substitutions, then
ϕ ⊢L ψ =⇒ ϕ |∼SL ψ for all formulas ϕ and ψ in LL. In particular, by Theorem 3.7,
all derivable rules of PD and InqL are F -admissible in the logics. A logic that is
S-structurally complete has no nontrivial S-admissible rules: all such rules are deriv-
able in the logic. Classical logic is structurally complete, but intuitionistic logic is
not, as are many other intermediate logics. The well-known example showing that
intuitionistic logic is not structurally complete uses Harrop’s Rule:
ϕ → ψ ∨θ |∼IPC (ϕ → ψ)∨ (ϕ → θ ) and ϕ → ψ ∨θ 6⊢IPC (ϕ → ψ)∨ (ϕ → θ ).
Recall the definition of
⊔ just below Lemma 2.4: ϕ⊔i ϕi holds if and only if
ϕi |= ϕ for all i, and for all teams X : X |= ϕ implies X |= ϕi for some i.
Lemma 5.3 For any L which is an intermediate theory or one of PD, InqL or PT,
and any set S of L-substitutions, if for every consistent formula ϕ in LL there exists
a finite set {ϕi | i ∈ I} of S-projective formulas in LL such that ϕ⊔i∈I ϕi, then L is
S-structurally complete.
Proof We show that every S-admissible rule ϕ |∼SL ψ of L is derivable, i.e., ϕ ⊢L ψ .
If ϕ is inconsistent, then clearly ϕ ⊢L ⊥ ⊢L ψ . Now assume that ϕ is consistent. By
assumption there exists a finite set {ϕi | i ∈ I} of S-projective formulas such that
ϕ⊔i∈I ϕi. Let σi ∈ S be the projective unifier of ϕi. Thus ⊢L σi(ϕi). Hence ⊢L σi(ϕ)
for all i ∈ I. From ϕ |∼SL ψ we derive ⊢L σi(ψ) for each i ∈ I. Since σi is a projective
unifier for ϕi, we have that ϕi,σi(ψ) ⊢L ψ . It follows that ϕi ⊢L ψ for each i ∈ I.
Therefore ϕ ⊢L ψ .
Theorem 5.4 PD, InqL and PT are F -structurally complete.
Proof By Theorem 2.12 for the extended logics, Lemmas 4.6 and 5.3.
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Let L be an intermediate theory/logic and S a set of ⊢L-substitutions. We say that
L is S-hereditarily structurally complete if for any intermediate theory L′ such that
L⊆ L′ and S is a set of ⊢L′-substitutions, L′ is S-structurally complete. In case S is the
class of all substitutions of L, then we say that L is hereditarily structurally complete.
It is known that none of ND, KP and ML is hereditarily structurally complete.
Theorem 5.5 For any intermediate logic L such that ND ⊆ L, its negative variant
L¬ is ST -hereditarily structurally complete. In particular, ND¬, KP¬ and ML¬ are
ST -hereditarily structurally complete.
Proof By Theorem 2.15, Lemmas 4.7 and 5.3.
6 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the three propositional logics of dependence, PD, PT, InqL, are
structurally complete with respect to flat substitutions and that the negative variant of
every intermediate logic that is an extension of ND is hereditarily structurally com-
plete with respect to stable substitutions. In particular, ND¬, KP¬ and ML¬ are ST -
hereditarily structurally complete. The reason for this are the strong normal forms
that hold in these logics or theories. In this aspect they resemble classical logic, with
its disjunctive normal form, that is also hereditarily structurally complete.
Apart from [18] there has not been much research on admissibility on interme-
diate theories that are not intermediate logics, and for propositional logics of depen-
dence the above results are the first of such kind. Thus, naturally, many questions
remain open. We discuss several of them.
Theorem 5.5 states that the negative variant of extensions of ND are hereditarily
structurally complete. It follows from results by Maxsimova and Prucnal that any
structurally complete intermediate logic with the disjunction property contains KP
and is contained in ML, and in [24], which recaptures these results, it is moreover
shown that KP itself is not structurally complete. The same holds for ND, since it is
properly contained in KP. One wonders whether the fact that the negative variant of
ND and KP are structurally complete could shed some light on admissibility in the
original logics.
In this paper the results on admissibility are with respect to sets of substitutions,
such as the flat and the stable substitutions. There exist logics for which establishing
whether admissibility has certain properties, such as decidability, seems hard. These
problems are often considered only for admissibility with respect to all substitutions,
but one could start with smaller sets of substitutions, which may be easier to deal with.
And although certain properties, such as decidability of admissibility, do not transfer
from a smaller set of substitutions to its extensions, understanding a restricted case
may stil help understanding the general case.
On a more abstract level, there are two definitions of admissibility in the litera-
ture that in most instances amount to the same notion. Although intuitively clear, the
proper connection between the two is not completely straightforward [14,17]. And it
is mostly considered only for admissibility with respect to the set of all substitutions.
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It would be nice to see whether this connection can be generalized to admissibility
with respect to any set of substitutions.
The results obtained in this paper made essential use of the disjunctive normal
form of formulas of propositional logics of dependence. It is known from the litera-
ture that modal dependence logic and propositional independence logic both have a
similar disjunctive normal form [25,5]. We conjecture that the argument in this paper
may apply to these two logics and lead to similar results.
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